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THE CONCEPTION OF THE HUMAN
PERSON
EUGENE HARPER,

I am a New York City Catholic who was educated by the
Dominican nuns at St. Rosalina Parish in Washington Heights.
In the 1940s and 1950s, Catholic social thought consisted
basically of having nine children and sending all of them to
parochial schools.
I would like to begin by talking about the human person. I
think that in order to talk about the common good in Catholic
social thought, one needs to begin with a discussion of the
conception of the human person and then move to the discussion
of the common good.' As lawyers, we have to take account of the
principle competing political philosophy of liberalism, and ask
ourselves how we compare the two for purposes of Catholic social
thought.
What is Catholic social thought's understanding of the
human person? To answer this, I think one has to begin with a
conception of the human person. Philosophically, I would begin
with Aristotle's ethics and add politics: together they give rise to
2
the full-blown natural law theory.
Aristotle's conception of human flourishing, eudaimonia (the
function of man), can be found in Chapter Seven of Book One of
his NicomacheanEthics. 3 It is the activity of the soul exhibiting
excellence in a complete life.4 Aristotle began by carefully
analyzing responsibility and choice, and ultimately addressed
the distinction between intentions on the one hand, and side
effects on the other. He described the cardinal virtues of
t J.D., University of Virginia School of Law; BA., Fordham College. Partner,
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey L.L.P. in New York.
1 See JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 48-49 (1966)

(defining the common good as "a good received and communicated").
2

See ARISTOTLE, NiCOMACHEAN ETHICS (Martin Ostwald ed., 1962).

See id. at 17-18. Eudaimonia means to be "[hlappy, usually in the sense of a
happiness attained by man through his own efforts." Id. at 307.
4 See id. at 14-18.
3
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prudence, phronesis [practical wisdom], right reason in control,
directive of passions and emotions, and justice, distributive and
communicative, as well as courage. 5 Aristotle's concept of
friendship or philia provides the foundation for our look at what
6
is considered the human person.
Theologically, I would proceed by way of the New
Testament, the interpretation of Scripture, and the tradition of
the church fathers. The human person is created in the image
and likeness of God, 7 with an ontological dignity to be fulfilled in
and through identity and participation in the church community.
The church community is the mystical body of the people of God.
In Aquinas, we find the great synthesis of Aristotle's
philosophy with Christianity. Eudaimonia became beatitude,
and the cardinal virtues are perfected by the Christian virtues of
faith, hope and love.8 Aquinas also developed a full-blown
natural law theory whose first precept, the first principle of
practical reason is "good is to be done and pursued, and evil...
avoided," 9 and it is a principle that every human person grasps.
The human person is inherently social and needing others.
We are "dependent rational animals," disposed toward the good,
habituated in that disposition by virtuous acts, with reason,
capable of both theoretical knowledge, or episteme, aimed at
knowing truth and practical knowledge, phronesis, aimed at
doing good.10
We ultimately have John Paul II's profound analysis of the
acting person, which Father John Coughlin would be able to
5 See id. at 312.
6 See id. at 311-12.
7 Genesis 1:26-27. 'Then God said: 'Let us make man in our image, after our

likeness ....

God created man in his image; in the divine image he created him;

male and female he created them." Id.
8 See MARITAIN, supranote 1, at 20-21.
9 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Pt. I-II,

Q.

94, art. 2 (Fathers of

the English Dominican Province trans., 1947). St. Thomas stated:
the first principle in the practical reason is one founded on the notion of
good.., that good is that which all things seek after. Hence this is the first
precept of law, that good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be
avoided. All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that

whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil)
belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or
avoided.
Id.
10 ALASDAIR

MACINTYRE,

DEPENDENT

BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES 14-15, 151 (1999).
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speak on much better than I would, given his current work
deriving ministry law principles from the Christian concept of
the person.
What is "the good" for the human person? Again, Aristotle
begins to answer this with the concept of full human
flourishing-eudaimonia." Aquinas follows eudaimonia and
adds God and redemption and we arrive at beatitude.
Modern natural law theorists fight with each other (the
traditionalists against the new natural law theorists) over how
one comes to know what is entailed in the concept of full human
14
3
The traditionalists, Mclnerny, 1 Hittinger,
flourishing. 12
Henle,15 and Veatch, 16 assert that one derives human good from
prior philosophical anthropology or metaphysics of the nature or
essence of the human person.
19
18
The new theorists, Grisez, 7 Finnis, Boyle, and Robert
George, 20 assert that one cannot derive an ought from an is,
therefore, knowledge of basic human good is underived and selfevident, known through reflection on experience and not by
deduction from prior knowledge.
The traditionalist answer to Hume 21 is that natural essences
are indeed dispositional; that the ought is contained in the is;

1

See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 307.
12 See generally Jack B. Sarno, A NaturalLaw Defense of Buckley v. Valeo, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 2693 (1998).
13 See RALPH M. MCINERNY, THE LOGIC OF ANALOGY: AN INTERPRETATION OF
ST. THOMAS (1961).

14 See Russell Hittinger, NaturalLaw and Virtue: Theories at Cross Purposes,
reprinted in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 42 (Robert P. George

ed., 1992); see also Robert P. George, Review: Recent Criticism of Natural Law
Theory: Russell Hittinger'sa Critique of the New NaturalLaw Theory, 55 U. CHI. L.

REV. 1371, 1407 (1988).
IsSee R.J. HENLE, THE AMERICAN THOMISTIC REVIVAL IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS OF RJ. HENLE, S. J. (1999).
16 See HENRY B. VEATCH, FOR ONTOLOGY OF MORALS: A CRITIQUE OF
CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL THEORY (1971).
17 See GERMAIN GRISEZ & RUSSELL SHAW, BEYOND THE NEW MORALITY: THE
RESPONSIBILITIES OF FREEDOM (1974).
Is See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
19 See Joseph Boyle, Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions, reprinted in
NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS, supra note 14, at 3.
20 See Robert P. George, Natural Law and Human Nature, reprinted in
NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS, supra note 14, at 31.
21 See JAMES V. MCGLYNN & JULES J. TONER, MODERN ETHICAL THEORIES 24-

27 (1962) (explaining, briefly, Hume's attack on traditional philosophy).
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that Hume's mathematical metaphysics is bad metaphysics. 22 I
do not know who is right as between the traditionalists and the
new theorists. As a lawyer, I know only that both come out the
same way on virtually every moral issue, and one wonders what
all the fuss is about in the academic community.
The new natural law theorists do, however, provide a handy
summary of basic human goods that constitute full human
flourishing. These include life and the transmission of life,
knowledge, excellence in activity, and four different kinds of
harmony: inner peace, authenticity, friendship, and religion. 23
This summary provides me with a way of thinking about and
teaching the subject.
The next question is how does the human person achieve the
good? Again, beginning with Aristotle and following through
with Aquinas, the answer is through virtuous conduct. In the
new natural law theory, the basic moral principle, which follows
from the basic principle of practical reason, is that one should
will only those acts that are compatible with integral human
24
fulfillment in the basic human goods.
There are intermediate principles that have to be taken into
account. They are negative prescriptions against acting contrary
to basic human goods. They embody the virtues proscribing or
discouraging action arising from human flaws or vices. They
essentially amount to the Golden Rule-to treat others as you
would have others treat you and your loved ones-and the
Pauline Principle-do not intend evil-even if you think good
will come of it.25
Now, turning to the common good, one might ask what does
Catholic social thought mean by the common good? I will repeat
a little of Professor Garnett's ideas in reaching an answer.
Following Catholic social thought of the common good is a set of
conditions permitting each human person to seek and to achieve
the human goods in ways that cannot be done alone. In other
words, the sum total of social conditions that allow persons to
perfect themselves in the community leads to the common good.
Standing between the individual and the government,
however, is a thick complex of associations, each of which aims
22
23
24
25

See FINNIS, supra note 18.
See supra notes 17-19.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See Romans 3:8.
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at the common good of its constituent members. These include
the family, the extended family, the neighborhood, fraternal
organizations, labor unions, professional organizations, parishes,
Little League, and all sorts of nonprofit institutions and
organizations.
When looking at the role of government, specifically the
public component of the common good, Catholic social thought
focuses in on two items: peace on the one hand and justice on the
other, distributive and commutative or corrective justice. It is
here that Catholic social thought invokes the principle of
subsidiarity, grounded more deeply in the breast of Aristotle's
concept of friendship, sociability, and philia.26 In order words,
full human flourishing normally requires the smaller association
to instantiate the common good.
A lawyer, particularly one working in or around the public
sector as I do, tends to focus on distributive justice. The
structure of distributive justice, which Aristotle referred to as
"proportionate equality,'2 7 again really derives from the ethics
and the politics and is picked up by Aquinas in his discussion of
justice in the Summa Theologica.28 Aristotle believed that
everybody agreed that distributive justice is proportional
equality based on merit, but not everyone agrees on what merit
is.29 An aristocrat would say merit is virtue and an oligarch
would say it is wealth. A democrat would say all citizens are
equally meritorious when considering distribution of the common
stock of resources of the polis. We have the identical discussion
going on some 2000 years later about distributive justice and
what constitutes merit.
What are the requirements of Catholic social thought in
terms of distributive justice? There is no mathematical formula
Prudential considerations lead to
that determines this.
judgments, taking account of need, function and capacity,
desserts and contributions.3 0 Need is determined by one's role,
26 See ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 214-47 (Sir
David Ross ed., 1961) (describing generally the existence, basis, and need for each of
these concepts).
27 Id. at 118-19.
28 See AQUINAS, supra note 9, at Part II, Q. 58-122.
29 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 26, at 119-20 (describing generally that

establishing compatibility of proportionate equality is a subjective determination
that cannot be exact).
30 See FRINIS, supra note 18, at 174-75.
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responsibility, and capacity. Aristotle stated, "flutes to flute
players."31 As lawyers, we might focus on the distribution of
costs and losses in connection with the creation of "foreseen
32
risks."
Aquinas would have looked to what one needs for oneself,
what one needs for those one is responsible for, and the balance
he would call superflua3 to be put to use for the common good.
From the perspective of lawyers acting today, we have to
take account of a liberal political theory that says the expiring of
Marxist socialism is really the main competitor to Catholic social
theory. I do not mean the current left-right political spectrum.
Liberal political theory may be seen as a tradition of political
thought that has two basic strands, each of which focuses in
different degrees on two main concepts: freedom and equality.
The utilitarian strand is frequently libertarian and takes the
stance that the person is seen as the sum of desires and demands
with no such thing as intrinsic good as part of the fabric of the
universe. The common good is seen as maximizing utility,
reflected in an aggregate demand and overall efficiency.
Utilitarian liberalism is teleological, but the end is maximizing
utility. There is no such thing as that intrinsic good, which the
Catholic social thought tradition focuses on.
The other strand is neo-Kantian and is frequently
egalitarian. This strand believes the person upon whom the
theory is based is very different from the person earlier
described. It is a hypothetical individual in the original position
who is located behind a veil of ignorance, not knowing his or her
actual endowments or position in society.
To achieve the common good in this strand of liberal
thinking, the government needs to be neutral as to the good; to
have no position as to the good, but to create conditions
permitting autonomous choice. This is the only way of showing
equal respect and concern.
Utilitarian liberalism is a major force in our common law
thinking, law in economics, whereas, Neo-Kantian liberalism is a
dominant public philosophy in our constitutional law thinking.

31
32

Id. at 175 (quoting Aristotle).

Id.

3 See ARITSTOTLE, supra note 26.

